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COMMENTS
L'EUROPEENNE DE BANQUE v. LA
REPUBLIC DE VENEZUELA:
UNNECESSARILY PERMITTING
FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS TO SUE




One result of the increased globalization of world trade has
been an increase in litigation in which a foreign state is a de-
fendant in a United States court.1 To ensure that United States
citizens and corporations have reliable access to judicial review
of their disputes, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976 (FSIA or Act).2 Under the FSIA, claims of
1. Note, Suits by Foreigners Against Foreign States in United States Courts: A
Selective Expansion of Jurisdiction, 90 YALE L.J. 1861, 1862 (1981) [hereinafter Note,
Foreigner - Foreign State Suits].
The legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA or Act) indi-
cates the variety of such transactions:
Instances of ... [contact between American citizens and Foreign states] occur
when [United States] businessmen sell goods to a foreign state trading com-
pany, and disputes may arise concerning the purchase price. Another [in-
stance] is when an American property owner agrees to sell land to a real estate
investor that turns out to be a foreign government entity and conditions in the
contract of sale may become a subject of contention. Still another example oc-
curs when a citizen crossing the street may be struck by an automobile owned
by a foreign embassy.
Id. at n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AsIN. NEws 6604, 6605 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487]).
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988)).
The principle of foreign sovereign immunity has been defined as:
[A] rule of customary law rather than of mere comity, and it means that a
foreign sovereign state, its public property and its official agents are in general
immune from the local jurisdiction unless the foreign state consents to its exer-
cise. If any question arises between the territorial sovereign and a foreign state
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jurisdictional immunity are to be determined by federal and
state courts in conformity with the principles set forth in the
Act.3 Although the Act's premise is that foreign governments
have jurisdictional immunity from United States courts, there
are five exceptions to this immunity, one of which is the "com-
mercial activities exception." If the foreign sovereign's activity
in question is deemed to be commercial, one of three additional
factors must be present in order to subject the foreign sovereign
to the jurisdiction of United States courts.4 One such factor is
that the activity of the foreign sovereign must have a direct ef-
fect in the United States. 5
In L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela,6
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York was asked to determine whether the Venezuelan Gov-
ernment's nationalization of a Venezuelan bank fell within the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA, and, if it did,
whether the financial injury that resulted to a consortium of for-
eign banks that had loaned money to the Venezuelan bank had a
direct effect in the United States.7 The court ultimately dis-
missed the suit because it did not have personal jurisdiction over
the Venezuelan Government.8 Before doing so, however, it held
that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA because
the nationalization constituted commercial activity within the
meaning of the Act and the nationalization had a direct effect in
the United States."
Commentators have often criticized the FSIA for its vague
definitions of such important terms as "commercial activity,"
and have also criticized United States courts for failing to de-
it can only be taken up through the diplomatic channel or in some interna-
tional forum unless the foreign state waives its immunity from the local
jurisdiction.
J. BRmRLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243-44 (6th ed. 1963).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
4. Under the FSIA, a foreign state is not immune from United States jurisdiction
when an action against it is based upon: (1) a commercial activity conducted in the
United States by that state; (2) an act performed in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of that state elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state carried on elsewhere that
causes a direct effect on United States commerce. Id. at § 1605.
5. Id.
6. 700 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
7. L'Europeenne, 700 F. Supp. at 114.
8. Id. at 125.
9. L'Europeene, 700 F. Supp. at 119, 121.
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velop a consistent framework for determining when an act by a
foreign sovereign constitutes commercial activity.1° In contrast,
United States courts have consistently construed the direct ef-
fect exception strictly. This Comment examines the case law and
legislative history of the commercial activities exception of the
FSIA, the "direct effect" language of the exception, and the
court's decision in L'Europeenne. It concludes that the court's
ruling in L'Europeenne reflects the inconsistency often present
in deciding the commercial activity question. Further, this Com-
ment concludes that the court's ruling contravenes Congres-
sional intent as well as the line of cases regarding what consti-
tutes a direct effect under the Act. The court's holding
unnecessarily expands the definitions of both commercial activ-
ity and direct effect.
This Comment will argue that courts should return to the
original model of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign im-
munity when determining whether the acts of a foreign sover-
eign should be considered commercial within the meaning of the
FSIA.11 The courts should determine whether the act could have
been carried out by a private individual or if the act was purely
governmental, which would entitle it to sovereign immunity.
This was the earliest embodiment of the restrictive theory and is
the standard the Act's legislative history indicates Congress in-
tended when the FSIA was passed.' 2
In determining whether an act of a foreign sovereign has a
direct effect in the United States, courts should strictly adhere
to the language of the Act, which refers to Section 18 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law (Section 18). 11
Section 18 calls for a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect in
the United States of the conduct abroad.14
10. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 222-24 (1951). See also infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
Comment, Martin v. Republic of South Africa: Alienating Injured Americans, 15
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 153, 154-55 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Martin v. South Africa].
Comment, De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua: Too Many Exceptions to the
Commercial Activities Exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976., 14
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 715, 719 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, De Sanchez v. Nicaragua].
11. For a discussion of the restrictive theory, see Comment, De Sanchez v. Nicara-
gua, supra note 10, at 719-22.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws at 6605. Comment, De Sanchez v. Nicaragua, supra note 10, at 720.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND)].
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 13, at § 18. See infra note 55.
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This Comment concludes that although providing a forum
for the resolution of disputes might occasionally promote United
States interests, the adjudication of claims by foreign plaintiffs
against foreign sovereigns by United States courts could lead to
the avoidance of the United States as a place to do business and
also might hurt American foreign policy interests.
II. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the FSIA to regularize the law governing
foreign sovereign immunity and to make it less dependent on
political factors.15 Congress also intended that the Act provide
the "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving ques-
tions of sovereign immunity.' 6 To ensure consistent treatment
of foreign governments in United States courts, the Act places
the determination of sovereign immunity exclusively in the
hands of the courts.'1 The FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of
15. Until 1952 foreign nations enjoyed absolute immunity from the judicial process
of the United States. This policy was first referred to in Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (granting immunity to French Warship
within United States territorial waters). By the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
had formally adopted the policy that separation of powers required judicial deference to
the Executive in matters concerning foreign sovereign immunity. The decision to recog-
nize or disregard the state's immunity came to rest with the United States Department
of State (State Department), which made formal suggestions to the courts regarding im-
munity. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1945) ("the policy
recognized both by the Department of State and the Court [is] that the national interest
will be best served when controversies growing out of the judicial seizure of vessels of
foreign governments are adjudicated through diplomatic channels rather than by the
compulsion of judicial proceedings"). These recommendations bound the courts after Ex
parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (suit dismissed because of State Department deter-
mination of immunity).
As states assumed a greater role in commercial trade, however, the absolute immu-
nity of foreign states was challenged under the theory that there was no justification
under modern international law principles for allowing foreign states to avoid all liability
arising from their commercial activities or torts. In 1952 the State Department re-
sponded to these criticisms by adopting the restrictive theory of immunity, which limits
immunity to public, as opposed to commercial, acts of the foreign sovereign. Letter of
Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to acting Attorney General Philip B. Perelman (May
19, 1952) reprinted in 26 DEi'T ST. BuLL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. The State
Department's position remained dispositive until 1977, when the FSIA's delegation of
decision making authority to courts took effect.
For a fuller account of the history of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, see,
e.g., Comment, De Sanchez v. Nicaragua, supra note 10; Comment, Martin v. South
Africa, supra note 10.
16. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6610.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6610.
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sovereign immunity."" It grants blanket immunity to foreign gov-
ernments but enumerates five exceptions and conditions under
which a foreign sovereign will be subject to the jurisdiction of
United States courts."l One of these five exceptions is the com-
mercial activities exception, which is designed to cover certain
activities carried on within or outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.2"
A. The Commercial Activities Exception to the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act
The commercial activities exception 21 is the most litigated,
and therefore the most important, exception to sovereign immu-
nity created by the Act.22 Under the Act, commercial activity is
The FSIA also provides standards for determining if personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant exists and restricts the immunity of foreign government property from
satisfaction of judgments. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 6610-12.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1988).
19. The five exceptions are: (1) waiver of sovereign immunity by the foreign govern-
ment; (2) commercial activity by the foreign government in the United States; (3) con-
version of property in violation of international law; (4) disputes over real property lo-
cated in the United States; and (5) noncommercial tortious acts. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-
(5) (1988).
The Act applies only to foreign states, their political subdivisions, and their agencies
and instrumentalities. Id. at § 1603(a). This section defines "foreign state" for all sec-
tions of the Act except section 1608. For section 1608 purposes, "foreign state" refers
only to the state itself. Id. at § 1608.
An agency or instrumentality is defined as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is orned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a state of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
Id. at § 1603.
20. Id. at § 1605(a)(2).
21. The commercial activities exception provides in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the [s]tates in any case -
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States...
Id.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 18-19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 6617. See also Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1,
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defined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act."2 3 The Act also states
that "the commercial character [of a foreign state's conduct]
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference
to its purpose."'24 However, it is not sufficient that the foreign
state engages in commercial activity; the claim must be related
to the specific commercial activity or act upon which jurisdiction
is based.25 Fear of transforming United States courts into inter-
national courts of claims and of adversely affecting international
trade were motivating factors underlying the related claim re-
quirement.26 Despite this limitation, it was argued shortly after
the Act's passage that the Act's effect would be to increase the
number of suits filed in United States courts.
Entities that usually engage in an activity for profit are pre-
sumed to be engaged in a commercial activity.28 Because the def-
inition is so ambiguous, however, courts have had difficulty in
determining whether the activities of foreign sovereigns consti-
tute commercial activity, and courts have noted the FSIA's lack
of clarity.
2
The leading case in this area is Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.30 In Texas Trading, Nige-
ria contracted to buy huge quantities of cement from several
trading companies, including Texas Trading & Milling, a New
at 1865 n.25. See also Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and their Corporations:
Sovereign Immunity, 85 CoM. L.J. 228, 230 (1980) (describing the commercial activities
exception as the "core" of the FSIA).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) (quoting the
testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Hearings on H.R. 11315, at 315).
Examples of commercial activities provided in the Act's legislative history include "a
foreign government's sale of a service or product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of
money, its employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or
marketing agents, or its investment in a security of an American corporation, would be
among those included within the definition." See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at
16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6615.
27. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1862.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws at 6615.
29. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
30. Id.
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York corporation.31 Nigeria repudiated its contracts when it
found that its ports could not handle all the goods being im-
ported.32  The trading companies sued for breach of contract.33
Nigeria sought a declaration of sovereign immunity.3 4 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) held that Ni-
geria's act of entering into contracts to buy cement was commer-
cial within the meaning of the FSIA.35 The Second Circuit set
forth three possible standards for determining if a foreign sover-
eign's conduct constituted commercial activity. The most impor-
tant of the three was derived from the legislative history of the
FSIA: the court concluded that if the activity was one in which a
private person could engage, it was commercial, and under the
Act, a lawsuit based on that activity could be heard in the
United States. 6 The court dismissed Nigeria's argument that
31. Id. at 303. Trading companies are not industrial corporations. They buy prod-
ucts from one party and sell to another, hoping to make a profit on the differential.
Although it had the money to pay for all the goods it was buying, Nigeria's ports could
not handle the deluge of imports. Id.
32. Id. at 302.
33. Id. Four New York trading companies sued. Texas Trading lost its suit when the
judge found jurisdiction lacking. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 500 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The other three companies, in a consolidated
action, were awarded $1.857 million after the trial judge found jurisdiction present. De-
cor by Nickkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The two cases were consolidated in Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 300.
34. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 302.
35. Id. at 310.
36. Id. at 309. The court relied on the statement of a high Justice Department offi-
cial to support its conclusion: "[I]f a government enters into a contract to purchase goods
and services, that is considered a commercial activity. It avails itself of the ordinary
contract machinery. It bargains and negotiates. It accepts an offer. It enters into a writ-
ten contract and the contract is to be performed." Statement of Bruno Ristau, then chief
of the Foreign Litigation Section of the Civil Division, Department of Justice. Id. (quot-
ing 1976 Hearings at 51).
The second standard the court cited was "the very large body of case law which
exist[ed]" in American law upon passage of the Act. Id. (quoting testimony of Monroe
Leigh, 1976 Hearings at 53). The court went on to cite a series of cases which held that,
since the Tate Letter, see supra note 15, United States courts had followed the restric-
tive theory of jurisdiction. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 309 (quoting testimony of Charles
N. Bower, then Legal Adviser of the Department of State, 1973 Hearings at 15). (The
cases the court cited included Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen-
eral de Abastecimiento y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965)).
The third standard was that of contemporary international law. The court found
that the drafters of the FSIA intended to bring American sovereign immunity practices
into line with that of other nations. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 309. The court found
that international law follows the restrictive theory of immunity and that this, therefore,
is what the drafters intended of United States law. Id. at 310 (citing State Immunity
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the purpose for which the cement was to be used was not com-
mercial.37 The court stated that "if a government goes into the
market places of the world and buys boots or cement - as a
commercial transaction - that government should be subject to
all the rules of the marketplace."38
Although many courts have followed the standard defining
commercial activity described in Texas Trading, the definition
of commercial activity employed by the Act has often lead to
divergent results in cases with similar fact patterns. For exam-
ple, in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,39 the plaintiffs were United
States citizens who bought dollar-denominated certificates of de-
posit (CDs) from a privately owned Mexican bank."e In 1982
Mexico nationalized all privately owned banks, including
Bancomer, and promulgated regulations requiring that banks
pay interest and principal on the CDs in Mexican Pesos at the
official rate of exchange, a considerably lower amount of money
than Bancomer's contract with the plaintiffs provided. The
plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and securities
violations.41
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit)
held that once Bancomer was nationalized by the Mexican Gov-
ernment it became an agency of a foreign state within the mean-
ing of the FSIA and would ordinarily be entitled to immunity
from jurisdiction of United States courts under the FSIA.42 The
court held, however, that the suit arose from Bancomer's com-
mercial activity.43 It stated that "analysis must focus on the de-
fendant's acts which are the basis of the action and not on the
separate acts of other sovereign instrumentalities or agencies."4
The court stated that the gravamen of the complaint was the
Act, 1978 § 3 (United Kingdom); Council of Europe, European Convention on State Im-
munity art. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1976 Hearings at 37, 38; 45 I.L.R. 57 (1963) (West
Germany)).
37. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 310.
38. Id. (quoting Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2
W.L.R. 356, 369, 1 ALL E.R. 881). For a discussion of whether Nigeria's repudiation had
a direct effect in the United States within the meaning of the FSIA, see infra notes 58-62
and accompanying text.
39. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
40. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106.
41. Id. at 1104.
42. Id. at 1106.
43. Id. at 1107.
44. Id. at 1108 (quoting Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
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sale of the CDs and therefore the commercial activities excep-
tion applied. Relying on Texas Trading, the court held that it
was irrelevant that it was the Mexican Government's decrees
that required Bancomer to breach the contract.
45
Callejo was distinguished, however, in De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua.46 In De Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Nicaraguan Central Bank's refusal to honor a check on
the country's foreign exchange reserves did not constitute com-
mercial activity.47 The De Sanchez court distinguished Callejo
by noting that Banco Central "did not enter the marketplace as
a commercial actor" but became involved in the transaction
solely because of its role in regulating sales of foreign ex-
change.48 Because currency exchange regulation is a sovereign
function in which a private party cannot engage, the court held
that the commercial activities exception did not apply.4 9
The FSIA's ambiguous definition of commercial activity has
lead to confusion as to when acts of foreign sovereigns will sub-
ject them to the jurisdiction of United States courts. This prob-
lem can be resolved by returning to the original definition of re-
strictive immunity. Courts should distinguish between purely
governmental acts and acts of a sovereign that a private citizen
or corporation could also carry out, such as purchasing consumer
goods in the international marketplace °.5 Although this standard
has been criticized as too difficult to apply, factors such as the
presence or absence of a profit motive can be developed by
courts to determine whether or not the activity is commercial. 1
B. The Direct Effect Clause
The commercial activities exception confers jurisdiction on
United States courts for three types of activities.52 One of these
three is an act by a foreign sovereign outside the United States
that causes a direct effect in the United States.53 Although Con-
45. Id. at 1109.
46. 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1985).
47. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1393.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1393-94.
50. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985). See infra notes 108-11; see also MOL, Inc. v. People's
Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 112-14.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988). See supra note 4.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
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gress did not define direct effect in the FSIA, it did state that
where commercial conduct abroad causes a direct effect in the
United States, courts should exercise jurisdiction consistently
with the principles espoused in Section 18. Section'18 states in
part that the effects of the foreign conduct in the United States
must be substantial, direct, and foreseeable.55 The legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress was concerned with
the possibility that courts would be forced to hear many more
cases than they had prior to the Act's passage. 6 Therefore,
courts should apply the direct effect clause strictly. Courts have
generally done this, and plaintiffs have had to overcome a high
hurdle to prove that the foreign sovereign's act that caused their
injury also had a direct effect in the United States.
7
Courts are likely to find a direct effect where a financial in-
jury is suffered by a United States corporation because of a for-
eign sovereign's act outside the United States. In Texas Trad-
ing, the court, having found that Nigeria had engaged in
commercial activity, addressed the issue of whether that activity
54. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6618. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 13, at § 18.
55. Section 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or,
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect with the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the con-
duct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably devel-
oped legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 13, at § 18 (emphasis added). See Maritime Int'l
Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
56. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1862.
57. Effects jurisdiction derives from a state's interest in protecting those within its
borders and in governing events within its borders. Thus, to determine whether a corpo-
ration has sustained a direct effect within the United States, a court must determine
whether the corporation has sufficiently manifested itself within the jurisdiction so that
the loss sustained by the corporation may be deemed to have been sustained by an entity
within the jurisdiction. Note, Effects Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 474, 512 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Effects Jurisdiction].
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had a direct effect in the United States.5 8 It held that "the rele-
vant inquiry under the direct effect clause when the plaintiff is a
corporation is whether the corporation has suffered a direct fi-
nancial loss." 9 Although it conceded that neither the term "di-
rect" nor "effect" was easy to define, the court ruled that since
the plaintiff was a United States corporation that was to be paid
in the United States, Nigeria's repudiation created a direct ef-
fect in the United States. 0 The fact that Texas Trading was a
United States corporation was central to the court's ruling.6 1 In-
deed, the court noted that the question of whether a failure to
pay a foreign corporation in the United States or a failure to pay
a United States corporation abroad creates an effect in the
United States was not before it.
6 2
In a case where a foreign plaintiff sued a foreign sovereign,
Maritime Int'l Nomninees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of
Guinea,63 the court refused to find a direct effect in the United
States when Guinea's breach of contract resulted in lost profits
to a third party United States corporation.6 4 In MINE, the
plaintiff was a Liechtenstein corporation which entered into a
contract with the Guinean Government to establish and provide
shipping services to transport Guinean bauxite to foreign mar-
kets." MINE filed suit in the District of Columbia to enforce an
arbitrator's ruling, which Guinea opposed on the grounds of sov-
ereign immunity.6 MINE argued that Guinea's breach had a di-
rect effect in the United States because of profits lost by the
United States corporation that was "closely allied with MINE"
and that was financially harmed by the breach.' The MINE
court rejected this argument and found that Guinea was im-
mune under the FSIA because, even if MINE's allegations of
harm to the United States corporation were true, it did not con-
stitute a direct effect in the United States as contemplated by
58. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
311-12 (2d Cir. 1981).




63. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.D.C. 1982).
64. MINE, 693 F.2d at 1111.
65. Id. at 1095.
66. Id. at 1097-98.
67. Id. at 1110.
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the Act.6 8 The court reasoned that the harm alleged was not suf-
ficiently direct and foreseeable, since the corporation's involve-
ment in the venture was not reasonably contemplated by the
contract between MINE and Guinea."e
Another recent case involving the direct effect clause is
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann.70 In Gould, an Ameri-
can corporation brought action alleging violation of the Racket-
eer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act and misappropria-
tion of trade secrets against a French corporation whose sole
shareholder was the French Government.7 1 The complaint al-
leged that the defendant bought trade secrets from a former em-
ployee of the plaintiff's and in doing so engaged in unfair com-
petition. 2 The court, citing Callejo, found that the defendant's
negotiations with the plaintiff's former employee constituted
commercial activity.73 The court went on to state that:
economic injury to a United States corporation, as a result of a
foreign state's commercial activity may satisfy the 'direct ef-
fects' clause ... if the corporation is the primary direct, rather
than indirect, victim of the conduct, and if injurious and signif-
icant the financial consequences to that corporation were the
foreseeable, rather than fortuitous, result of the conduct.
7 4
The defendant argued that there was no direct effect in the
United States because any financial loss the plaintiff would suf-
fer would be due to competition in foreign markets.75 The court
rejected this contention, pointing out that plaintiff also alleged
misappropriation of its trade secrets, and stating that "it is diffi-
cult to imagine conduct which will have a more direct effect
upon plaintiff, which is located and operates in the United
States.""6
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1110-11.
70. 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988).
71. Gould, 853 F.2d at 447.
72. Id. at 447-48. The complaint also alleged that the defendant interfered with the
plaintiff's relationship with its former employee, unlawfully appropriated plaintiff's pro-
prietary information and trade secrets, and became unjustly enriched due to the misap-
propriation. Id. at 447.
73. The court stated "[a]n activity is commercial if it 'is of a type that a private
person would customarily engage in for profit."' Id. at 452 (quoting Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1108 (5th Cir. 1985)). See supra notes 39-45.
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United States courts have consistently applied the same test
to determine whether the foreign sovereign's commercial activity
has a direct effect in the United States. Relying on the legisla-
tive history's reference to Section 18, courts have strictly en-
forced the requirement that the financial injury must occur in
the United States, and that it must be substantial, direct, and
foreseeable.
III. L'EUROPEENNE dE BANQUE V. LA REPUBLIC dE VENEZUELA
A. Facts
In November 1981 the plaintiffs, a consortium of foreign
banks7 7 lead by L'Europeenne de Banque (LEB), a bank incor-
porated in France, entered into a deposit lending agreement
with Sociedad Financiera de Comercio (SFC), which, with its
parent corporation, formed one of Venezuela's largest financial
institutions. The deposit agreement had no termination date; in
effect it provided SFC with $30 million in revolving credit. 8
SFC was to repay the loan by depositing money in LEB's ac-
count in New York.79 This, together with the fact that the loan
was made and payable in United States dollars, was the only
connection between the loan agreement and the United States.80
In reaction to concerns about the bank's financial safety,
Venezuela took over the operations of SFC's parent corporation,
77. The consortium included 14 foreign banks. Between the time the consortium
was formed and the suit was filed, however, two other banks substituted for two original
members. One of the two new banks was a United States bank, Norwest Bank Minneap-
olis, N.A. (Norwest), but the court discounted Norwest's presence in the consortium,
holding that it was unclear whether it had joined before or after the repudiation had
occurred. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 116,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
78. Id. at 116.
79. Id. at 122.
80. Id. at 122, 125. According to L'Europeenne de Banque's (LEB) complaint, be-
ginning in or before March 1982, defendant Juan Vincente Perez Sandoval, who then
controlled Sociedad Financiera de Comercio (SFC) either directly or indirectly through
intermediary corporations, embarked on a scheme to loot the assets of SFC and to de-
fraud its creditors. The scheme did not come to the consortium's attention until March
1984 when SFC failed to make a payment due under the agreement. LEB, representing
the consortium, met with SFC's officers, including Perez Sandoval, who persuaded LEB
not to declare the loan in default. According to the complaint, Perez Sandoval subse-
quently made a series of false and misleading representations, including one for the pro-
vision of a collateral package (the assets a borrower pledges as security for a loan) as
security for SFC's debts, which induced LEB to continue to forgo recourse to judicial
remedies. Subsequently, Perez Sandoval fled Venezuela in 1985. Id. at 116.
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SFC, and two affiliated credit organizations on June 30, 1985.81
The resolution declaring the "intervention" granted all manage-
ment powers to Venezuela's Deposit Guaranty and Bank Protec-
tion Fund (the Fondo).82 The Fondo operated SFC for approxi-
mately fourteen months. On July 29, 1986, having already
provided SFC with $452 million in financial assistance, Vene-
zuela revoked the authorizations to function of both SFC and its
parent and ordered their immediate liquidations. 3 The consor-
tium, unsecured and unpaid, responded by filing suit against the
Venezuelan Government in United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. 4 Jurisdiction was alleged to be
present under the FSIA.s5
B. Holding
The court first addressed the question of whether it pos-
sessed subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 8 It agreed
with LEB that Venezuela had engaged in commercial activity
within the meaning of the FSIA by intervening in SFC's af-
fairs.8 7 In support of this conclusion, the court relied on a case
81. Id. at 117.
82. Id. La Republic de Venezuela's motion to dismiss stated that the Fondo is the
Venezuelan equivalent to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id. at 119 (quoting Mem-
orandum of Defendant La Republic de Venezuela in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 19-
21).
83. Id. at 117.
84. Id. The other defendants were SFC, it's wholly-owned subsidiary, the vice-presi-
dent of the Fondo who had run SFC between Venezuela's intervention and SFC's liqui-
dation, and SFC's original management, who the complaint accused of plundering SFC's
assets. See complaint paras. 2-9.
85. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86. Id. (citing Gross v. Houghland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984) ("federal court must satisfy itself that it has subject matter juris-
diction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims")).
The court first held that neither the waiver nor the expropriation exceptions to the
FSIA were applicable. LEB argued that, of the five exceptions to sovereign immunity
provided by section 1605(a), three applied: waiver of sovereign immunity, commercial
activity, and expropriation of assets in violation of international law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605
(a)(1)-(3) (1988).
87. L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 119. In response to LEB's argument
that Venezuela had engaged in a de facto nationalization by intervening in SFC's finan-
cial affairs, the court pointed out that, although the term "intervention" has been
equated with "nationalization," id. (citing Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1360
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Tabacalera Cubana, S.A. v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.,
379 F. Supp. 772, 773-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)), "nationalization" implies permanency and
profit motive. The court ruled that neither existed in this case. Id.
178
1991] L'EUROPEENNE DE BANQUE
decided in 1927, Metropolitan Savings Bank & Trust Co. v.
Farmers' State Bank,I which held that a bank which had been
temporarily taken over by the state of Nebraska was not entitled
to immunity from suit.aa
Once the L'Europeenne court determined that the act of
the Venezuelan Government constituted commercial activity,
the next issue to be determined was whether that activity had a
direct effect in the United States.90 If it did, Venezuela's appli-
cation for immunity would be rejected.9 In determining whether
this jurisdictional basis applied, the court held that nonpayment
of a debt payable in the United States causes a direct effect in
the United States, even when neither party is a United States
citizen. 2 In support of this conclusion, the court first pointed to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria93 as allowing such suits.94 The L'Europeenne court
conceded, however, that the Verlinden opinion held only that
foreign plaintiffs could bring suit under FSIA if the substantive
requirements of the Act are met." The court further noted that
Verlinden expressed no view as to whether the nonpayment of a
88. 20 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 624 (1928). For a discussion of
Metropolitan Savings, see infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
89. Metropolitan Savings, 20 F.2d at 779.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). In its brief supporting the motion to dismiss, Ven-
ezuela argued that, since only a sovereign could take over a bank, its intervention could
not be seen as a commercial act, and therefore it did not need to reach the question of
direct effect. Memorandum of Defendant La Republica de Venezuela in Support of Mo-
tion to Dismiss, 17-21.
91. LEB argued that Venezuela's intervention in SFC's financial affairs satisfied all
three of the requirements of the FSIA. Venezuela was so certain that its intervention did
not constitute commercial activity that its motion to dismiss did not make alternative
arguments as to whether its behavior, even if found to be within the commercial activi-
ties exception, was entitled to immunity under the Act. The court first rejected LEB's
claim that since Venezuela had assumed management of SFC it had also assumed over-
sight and management of the operations of SFC's subsidiaries, the three New York cor-
porations also named as defendants. Since the corporations principal purpose was the
management of real estate, the court stated, Venezuela's failure to repay the certificates
of deposit was not "based upon the commercial activity carriedon in the United States"
as required by the Act. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F.
Supp. 114, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
The second basis for jurisdiction under the FSIA, that the act was performed in the
United States, did not apply, the court stated, since Venezuela's repudiation occurred in
Venezuela. Id. at 121.
92. Id.
93. 461 U.S. 480 (1983). For a further discussion of Verlinden, see infra notes 120-
32.
94. L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 121.
95. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 490-91.
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note to a foreign corporation could have a direct effect in the
United States, the proposition that the court uses Verlinden to
support. s6
The L'Europeenne court then discussed the public policy
considerations in determining that Venezuela's intervention had
a direct effect in the United States.97 The court noted that in
Verlinden, the district court was concerned that finding jurisdic-
tion solely because credits were directed through American
banks would cause foreign states to divert business from the
United States to banks in foreign countries." However, the
L'Europeenne court then cited language from Allied Bank Int'l
v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,9 9 to show the contrary
public policy considerations; namely, that withholding jurisdic-
tion would jeopardize New York's status as a world financial
center if creditors entitled to payment in United States dollars
could not avail themselves of the protection of United States
courts.100
The L'Europeenne court stated that the fact that the con-
sortium maintained an account in the United States and agreed
to be paid in dollars was enough to "sufficiently implicate" the
96. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
97. The court began its discussion of the case's public policy considerations with the
following quote:
Effects jurisdiction derives from a state's interest in protecting those within its
borders and in governing events within its borders. Thus, to determine
whether a corporation has sustained a direct effect within a particular state a
court must inquire whether the corporation, by its activity vis-a-vis the poten-
tial forum state, sufficiently implicates that state's interest in protecting per-
sons within its territory.
L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 121 (quoting Note, Effects Jurisdiction, supra
note 57, at 512).
98. Id. at 121-22 (citing Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284,
1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
99. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). For a further
discussion of Allied Bank, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
100. The court stated that:
The United States has an interest in maintaining New York's status as one of
the foremost commercial centers in the world. Further, New York is the inter-
national clearing center for United States dollars .... The United States has
an interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United States
in United States dollars under contracts subject to the jurisdiction of United
States courts may assum that, except under the most extraordinary circum-
stances, their rights will be determined in accordance with recognized princi-
ples of contract law.
L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 122 (quoting Allied Bank v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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interest of the United States and, therefore, Venezuela's repudi-
ation caused a direct effect in the United States. 1' Having
found that Venezuela had engaged in commercial activity, and
that this activity had a direct effect in the United States, the
court addressed the question of whether it had personal jurisdic-




102. Id. at 122-25. The court began its personal jurisdiction analysis by declining to
hold Venezuela bound by SFC's agreement to consent to personal jurisdiction in the
Southern District of New York. Id. at 123. It ruled that Venezuela had not waived its
claim to sovereign immunity, either expressly or impliedly, because it had taken over
SFC to avert a potentially disastrous financial crisis, and because public policy required
that the waiver provision of the FSIA be construed narrowly. (citing Frolova v. U.S.S.R.,
761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Colonial Bank v. Compagnie Generale
Maritime et Financiere, 645 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also 1 J. MooRE, J.
LucAs, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEiN & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 0.66[2.-2]
at 700.164 (2d ed. 1988) (in connection with determining what acts constitute implied
waiver of sovereign immunity by foreign states, "it is to be noted that in litigation in-
volving an American State's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment the courts have
recognized implied waivers, but on the whole have taken a cautious approach in defining
the conduct that will result in a waiver").
Having found that the waiver provision of the FSIA did not apply, the court at-
tempted to determine whether Venezuela had sufficient contacts with the United States
to demonstrate the existence of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 123-25. The court (citing
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)), noted that "the exercise
of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice." Id. at 123.
The consortium alleged three contacts between the defendants and the United
States. The court noted that the contacts that are appropriate to consider are national in
scope: "the proper inquiry in determining personal jurisdiction in a case involving fed-
eral rights is one directed to the totality of a defendant's contacts throughout the United
States." Id. at n.10 (quoting Max Daetwylere Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293 (3d
Cir. 1985). The first alleged contact was the New York properties, which the complaint
alleged Perez Sandoval acquired with funds he "systematically and unlawfully converted
from SFC or its subsidiaries." Id. at 124 (quoting complaint para. 29). The second al-
leged contact was Perez Sandoval's transactions with a Miami bank in connection with
the purchase of shares in a Florida corporation. Id. (quoting complaint paras. 24-28).
The third alleged contact was that the payment from SFC to the plaintiffs was to occur
in New York. Id. (quoting complaint para. 19).
The court held that, inasmuch as there was no allegation in the complaint that any
representative of Venezuela had any contact with the United States in connection with
the intervention over SFC, and that none of the contacts alleged were sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over Venezuela, id. at 124-25, it would not comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to subject Venezuela to the court's
personal jurisdiction and the complaint was therefore dismissed without prejudice. Id. at
125.
103. Id.
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C. Analysis
L'Europeenne contributes to a pattern of inconsistency in
the case law addressing the issue of what constitutes commercial
activity by a foreign sovereign. Instead of applying the substan-
tial body of case law since the enactment of the FSIA, however,
the court relied on a case decided in 1927 to show that Vene-
zuela's intervention constitutes commercial activity. It also con-
tradicted both congressional intent and the case law in deter-
mining when a foreign sovereign's commercial activities have a
direct effect in the United States. Congress intended that the
direct effect clause be applied strictly, and United States courts
have enforced the clause that way. The L'Europeenne opinion
contravenes that line of cases.
1. Commercial Activity
In finding that Venezuela's takeover of the operations of
SFC constituted commercial activity under the FSIA, the court
relied solely on Metropolitan 'Savings Bank and Trust v.
Farmer's State Bank,104 a case decided forty-nine years before
the passage of the FSIA. In Metropolitan Savings, the plaintiff
bank sued to recover on a certificate of deposit issued by the
defendant bank, which at the time of suit was temporarily oper-
ated by the state of Nebraska. 105 The court denied the defend-
ant's claim of sovereign immunity, holding that the temporary
operation of the bank through a state agency, without disturbing
its corporate existence or identity, would not enable the bank to
assert sovereign immunity.
06
A more logical standard to determine whether a state's con-
duct constitutes commercial activity would be the one described
in MOL: if the activity is one that cannot be performed by a
private party, the foreign sovereign's application for immunity
104. 20 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 624 (1928).
105. Metropolitan Savings, 20 F.2d at 775-76.
106. Id. The ruling by the court in Metropolitan Savings is on weak ground insofar
as it relied on the prior Supreme Court rulings regarding the permanent takeover of
banks. Regardless of whether it is a traditional state function to run private banks, it
clearly is a traditional state function to ensure the safety and soundness of banks operat-
ing within that state's jurisdiction. It does not necessarily follow that because a perma-
nent takeover of a bank is not protected by sovereign immunity, a temporary takeover to
ensure the safety of the bank's deposits is similarly unprotected.
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should be granted.107 In Letelier v. Republic of Chile,08 the Sec-
ond Circuit, applying this test, stated that the "[ilnquiry there-
fore ordinarily focuses on whether the specific acts are those
that private persons normally perform, [or that] an individual
would customarily carry out for profit."'"" The court ruled that
the Chilean national airline, which was sued for transporting the
assassins of the plaintiff's decedent to the United States, was
entitled to immunity because, under the commercial activities
exception, property could only be attached if the activity caus-
ing injury was commercial in nature and that "an act of political
terrorism is not the kind of commercial activity Congress antici-
pated."" 0 The court found that the presence or absence of a
profit motive is a significant factor in determining whether an
activity is commercial."'
Government activities should not be held to constitute com-
mercial activity if a private party could not have carried out that
activity. In MOL v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,"2 the
court held that Bangladesh was entitled to sovereign immunity
because the activity complained of, breach of a contract for the
export of monkeys to be used for scientific research, was not
107. MOL v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 84 (1983), afl'd, 736
F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
108. 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
109. Letelier, 748 F.2d at 797. At the trial level, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death action against the Republic of Chile as survivors of the former Chilean Ambassa-
dor to the United States who was killed as a result of a car bomb in Washington, D.C.
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). The plaintiffs were
awarded a default judgment (the district court found subject matter jurisdiction under
the tort exception to immunity in section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA). The plaintiffs at-
tempted to enforce the judgment on property belonging to the Chilean national airline,
arguing that the commercial activity exception applied because the airline had brought
the assassins to the United States. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court thereafter held that the plaintiff creditors were entitled to an
appointment of a receiver of the airline's assets. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 575 F.
Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit subsequently reversed the district
court's decision. See Letelier, 748 F.2d at 790.
110. Id. at 799.
111. Id. at 797.
112. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). In MOL, the Ban-
gladesh Ministry of Agriculture granted a United States corporation a license to capture
and export rhesus monkeys. The agreement specified quantities and prices, required the
corporation to build a breeding farm in Bangladesh and was conditioned upon exclusive
use of the monkeys for scientific research. Bangladesh reserved the right to terminate the
agreement without notice if MOL failed to fulfill its obligations. After two years Ban-
gladesh terminated the agreement because MOL allegedly failed to build the breeding
farm and allegedly sold the monkeys to the United States armed services for radiation
experiments. Id. at 1329-30.
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commercial in nature."' The court ruled that the agreement be-
ing terminated was one that only a sovereign could have made
because the contract concerned the right to regulate imports, ex-
ports, and natural resources, which are sovereign functions, and
thus immunity was proper." 4
The L'Europeenne court's holding that Venezuela's inter-
vention in a domestic bank's affairs constitutes commercial ac-
tivity contradicts this test and results in the realization of a
Congressional concern when the FSIA was passed, that United
States courts would be convefted to international courts of
claims as a result of the Act's passage." 5 The test used in MOL
includes the idea that, if in performing the act the sovereign had
no profit motive, as the L'Europeenne court concedes Venezuela




Having found that Venezuela had engaged in commercial
activity, the L'Europeenne court relied in part on Texas Trad-
ing to support its conclusion that this activity had a direct effect
in the United States." 8 An important difference between Texas
Trading and L'Europeenne, however, is that Texas Trading was
a United States company, not a foreign company, as the plaintiff
banks in the consortium were. The fact that Texas Trading was
a United States corporation was critical to the court's ruling that
Nigeria's repudiation caused a direct effect in the United States:
the court noted that the question of "whether a failure to pay a
foreign corporation in the United States or a United States cor-
poration abroad creates an effect in the United States under
[the commercial activities exception]" was not before it." 9
The L'Europeenne court also relied on Verlinden B.V. v.
113. MOL, 736 F.2d at 1329.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
116. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
117. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1125 (1985); United States v. County of Arlington, Va., 702 F.2d 485, 488 (4th Cir.
1983).
118. L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 121.
119. Texas Trading & Milling v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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Central Bank of Nigeria120 in support of its conclusion that
there was a direct effect in the United States, stating that Ver-
linden allows for the possibility that injury to a foreign plaintiff
can have a direct effect in the United States. 121 The question in
Verlinden, however, was only whether a foreign citizen or corpo-
ration could ever sue a foreign defendant in United States courts
under the FSIA. 22 The Supreme Court, while holding that they
could, specifically left open the question of whether the facts in
that particular case allowed for subject matter jurisdiction under
the Act. 1
23
Verlinden arose out of the same set of transactions as Texas
Trading.124 The plaintiff was a Dutch corporation suing the Re-
public of Nigeria for the anticipatory breach of a letter of credit
for the purchase of a shipment of cement.125 Verlinden alleged
jurisdiction under the FSIA. 2 6 Both the district court and the
Second Circuit held that Nigeria was entitled to immunity under
the FSIA. 27 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding
that on the Act's face, foreign plaintiff's are allowed to sue for-
eign sovereigns in federal court, provided the substantive stan-
dards of the Act are satisfied.' 2 The Verlinden court expressed
no opinion as to whether financial injury to a foreign plaintiff
could ever have a direct effect in the United States. The court
then remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine
120. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
121. L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 121.
122. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489.
123. Id. at 497-98.
124. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
125. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 482 (1983).
126. The district court, while holding that the Act permitted actions by foreign
plaintiffs where both defendant and plaintiff were aliens, dismissed the action on the
ground that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity specified in the Act applied.
Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In ruling spe-
cifically that Nigeria's repudiation of the contract did not have a direct effect in the
United States, the court, after quoting the test given in Harris v. VAO Intourist Moscow,
481 F. Supp. 1056, 1062-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), held that the locus of the injury is disposi-
tive of jurisdiction. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1298. Under this test, the court held that
the effect on Verlinden in the United States was insufficient to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over Nigeria. Id.
The Second Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that the constitutional power of the
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits either arising under federal law or the
Diversity Clause does not extend to suits brought by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign
sovereign. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
127. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1284; Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 320.
128. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489.
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whether jurisdiction existed under the Act itself.129 The Su-
preme Court's opinion did not address the jurisdictional require-
ment that the act by a foreign sovereign have a direct effect in
the United States.1 0 Thus, the L'Europeenne court relied on an
opinion that it conceded "did not decide this particular ques-
tion."''11 Although Verlinden does allow for a finding of direct
effect, it also holds that the substantive standards of the Act
must be met."3 2 The substantive standard required to meet the
direct effect test is the one provided by Section 18.133 In
L'Europeenne, those standards, as applied by United States
courts since the Act was passed, were not met.
The line of cases since the passage of the FSIA leads to the
conclusion that Venezuela's intervention into SFC's operations
did not have a direct effect in the United States because it was
not sufficiently substantial or foreseeable as required by Section
18. Although the Second Circuit has never formally adopted this
standard, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all held that Sec-
tion 18 is the standard Congress intended.
34
After citing Verlinden to support the proposition that fi-
nancial injury to a foreign corporation could have a direct effect
in the United States, the court quoted the Second Circuit's opin-
ion in Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago'3"
to show the public policy concerns that New York's position as a
financial center would be harmed if creditors in LEB's position
could not bring suit in the United States. 13 Allied Bank con-
129. Id. at 497-98.
130. Id. at 490.
131. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
132. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S 480, 490-91 (1983).
133. See supra note 13.
134. See Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc. 826 F.2d 415, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1987) (effects
of foreign state's conduct must be "substantial" and a "direct and foreseeable" result of
that conduct to support jurisdiction under the FSIA); Gould v. Pechiney Ugine
Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 70-76. See also Rush-
Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 581 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 333 (1989); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd.,
877 F.2d 793, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a "foreign sovereign's activities must
cause an effect in the United States that is substantial and foreseeable in order to abro-
gate sovereign immunity"); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
135. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
136. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 122
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). For a full account of the Second Circuit's concern, see supra note 100.
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cerned the default on an international loan from Allied to three
Costa Rican banks including Banco Credito. The debtor banks
defaulted on their obligations as a result of an order restricting
external debt repayments which the Costa Rican Government is-
sued during an economic crisis.L3 7 Pursuant to its loan agree-
ment with the debtor banks, Allied sought to accelerate the out-
standing payments on the loans in the face of the debtor's
default. 38 The district court refused to grant summary judg-
ment to Allied on the grounds that the Costa Rican banks had a
strong Act of State doctrine defense.'-" The Second Circuit re-
versed, however, and granted Allied summary judgment, citing
in part the public policy concern the L'Europeenne court men-
tioned: the United States has an interest in protecting creditors
who make loans in dollars.140 Ironically, commentators have crit-
icized Allied as threatening to New York's position as a financial
center because it could have the effect of diverting business
away from New York banks.1
4 '
To assert jurisdiction under the direct effect clause, courts
must hold that the direct effect exists either where the corporate
entity is located, where the corporation is incorporated or where
it does business,'42 or the location of the act or omission that
causes the injury, either the designated place of defendant's per-
formance, or the place where the defendant's breach occurred.143
In LEB, the first alternative would lead to a country where one
of the banks in the consortium was incorporated or did business,
and the second alternative would lead to Venezuela, where the
government's intervention in the management of SFC and its re-
pudiation of the loan occurred. Neither alternative would allow
the suit to be heard in the United States.
Where the plaintiffs have been corporations, courts have ap-
plied the test imposed by Section 18 strictly.4 In MINE for ex-
137. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1442
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
138. Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1442.
139. Id. at 1443-44.
140. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22
(2d Cir. 1984). See supra note 100.
141. Note, Debt Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 613, 626 (1985).
142. Note, Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 57, at 510.
143. Note, Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 57, at 510.
144. It has been argued that when the plaintiff is a citizen, even a United States
citizen, courts have applied the test too strictly. See, e.g., Comment, Martin v. South
Africa, supra note 10, at 153-54. Comment, Martin v. South Africa argues that a con-
gressional amendment is needed to protect United States citizens injured abroad by acts
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ample, the court held that profits lost by Global, a third party
United States company, did not pass the test set forth by Sec-
tion 18.141 It was concluded that Global's loss was not a suffi-
ciently direct result of the defendant state's breach because
Global's "profit anticipating involvement" was not contemplated
by the contract between the foreign plaintiff and foreign state
defendant.146 In Gould, the plaintiff could point to specific harm
that occurred as a result of the act of the foreign sovereign as
being sufficiently substantial, direct or foreseeable: the plaintiff
allegedly lost profits as a result of France's actions.147 No such
effect in the United States took place as a result of Venezuela's
actions. In L'Europeenne, the only connection with the United
States were the loan to SFC that was to be repaid in dollars and
the presence of the bank account in New York that was to be
used to repay the loan.148 Neither of these factors sufficiently
implicates United States interests in protecting persons or cor-
porations within its territory.
In determining whether financial injury to a corporation is
sufficiently direct to meet the test imposed by the FSIA, a court
should determine whether the corporation has sufficiently mani-
fested itself within the United States so that the loss sustained
by the corporation may be deemed to have been sustained by a
United States corporation. Activities that would subject a for-
eign corporation to suit as a defendant are not necessarily suffi-
cient to allow courts to consider that corporation to be located
within the United States. Thus, the fact that the corporation
contracted to provide goods to someone located within the
United States or sent agents into the United States, is by itself
insufficient to attribute the location of the corporation's injury
to that state.'49 In contrast, the presence of an office or a factory
within the United States would probably be sufficient. 15 0 In de-
of foreign sovereigns and left without recourse because of courts application of direct
effect exception. Id. at 171-73.
145. Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, 693
F.2d 1094, 1111 (D.D.C. 1982). For a discussion of the facts and holding of the case, see
supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
146. MINE, 693 F.2d at 1111.
147. Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988). For a
discussion of the facts and holding of the case, see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying
text.
148. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republic de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
149. Note, Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 57, at 513.
150. Note, Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 57, at 513.
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termining whether the injury has had a direct effect in the
United States, a court should determine whether it is reasonable
to ascribe the loss sustained by the corporation to its presence
within the United States.
Although the court found that Venezuela did not have suffi-
cient contacts with the United States to allow the court to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over it, its expansion of the definitions
of commercial activity and of direct effect poses several
problems. While it is true that the United States will sometimes
have an interest in applying United States laws in lawsuits be-
tween foreign parties when claiming jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns, care should be taken not to unnecessarily harm
United States foreign policy or financial interests.' 5'
3. Harm to the United States as Financial Center
Perhaps the most important ramification of the court's
opinion is that parties entering into international contracts will
divert business from banks in the United States to banks in for-
eign countries in order to avoid being subject to the jurisdiction
of United States courts. As the international financial system
moves toward a system where London and Tokyo become
equally as accessible as New York, parties will be inclined to
transfer their business from one financial center to another to
avoid hostile legal environments. As the district court in Verlin-
den stated: "[S]olicitude for New York's 'preeminent financial
position' should induce the courts to forbear the exercise of ju-
risdiction in close cases.' 52 New York's position would be signif-
icantly weakened if the mere designation of American banks for
payment subjects foreign sovereigns to the jurisdiction of United
States courts. 53 It is true that very few elements of a jurisdic-
tion's business environment will, by themselves, have a decisive
effect in determining where financial transactions are conducted.
Nevertheless, particular laws or decisions may have exactly this
type of determinative impact.154
151. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State suits, supra note 1, at 1870. For example,
some United States laws "are designed to deter undesirable behavior affecting the
United States." Id.
152. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. at 1298 (quoting J. Zeevi &
Sons v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), 37 N.Y.2d 220, 227, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975)).
153. Id.
154. See Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1549, 1552-53 (1989).
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Businesses require a predictable legal environment, espe-
cially when their actions may subject them to suit in the United
States. It should be possible to know what constitutes commer-
cial activity and when that activity has a direct effect. As'origi-
nally adopted and interpreted, the FSIA attracted international
financial transactions to New York and, in response to its pas-
sage, the British State Immunity Act of 1978 was passed, partly
out of fear that the FSIA made New York a more attractive lo-
cation than London for the transaction of business involving for-
eign states.1 5 Decisions such as L'Europeenne dilute these
benefits.,
4. Foreign Policy Considerations
Other objections to the broad definition of commercial ac-
tivity and direct effect are that it may precipitate retaliatory lia-
bility abroad,15 and that it could open United States courts to a
flood of international litigation in which no United States inter-
ests are implicated.157 Even if relatively few suits are brought by
foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns in United States
courts these suits will nevertheless be important because they
often involve significant amounts of money.1"8
Additionally, since states have a particular interest in hav-
ing local controversies decided in its own courts,15 9 a suit
brought in a United States court might be brought more appro-
priately in another forum since that forum has a greater interest
in the suit. If, as in L'Europeenne, no significant United States
interest is implicated, the burden on United States courts of try-
ing such a suit may make more appropriate dismissal of the suit
in favor of the alternative jurisdiction. 60
155. Comment, The State Immunity Act 1978, 42 MOD. L. REV. 72, 72-73 (1979).
156. See Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1987).
157. See, e.g., Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne
de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984) (suit by foreign plaintiff against the Republic
of Algeria dismissed because no nexus existed between the plaintiff's claim and commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the Foreign defendant).
158. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1861 n.6 (citing Ver-
linden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (claim for more than $4.5
million); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D.D.C.
1978) (award of approximately $9 million)).
159. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1872.
160. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1872. See also Com-
ment, Forum Non Conveniens, Injunctions Against Suit and Full Faith and Credit, 29
U. CH. L. REv. 740, 749 (1962) (crowding of local dockets weighs in favor of forum non
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Also, for a United States court to exercise jurisdiction in a
foreigner-foreign state suit may adversely affect United States
foreign policy interests by having a branch of the United States
Government pass judgment on the actions of a foreign sovereign.
This will be especially true when the laws of sovereign immunity
in other nations differ from the rule established by the FSIA.
Foreign states are likely to object to the exercise of jurisdiction
over them in United States courts that would not be allowed in
their own courts.161 The United States already is commonly ac-
cused of infringing on the sovereignty of other nations by apply-
ing American law extraterritorially 1 2 This charge is likely to be
raised with special force when United States law is enforced
against a foreign state. Finally, even states with no objection in
principle to the extraterritorial application of United States law




Congress enacted the FSIA to regularize the process of ob-
taining jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in United States
courts. If parties can correctly anticipate when they will be sub-
ject to the laws of the United States, the Act will have served its
purpose; it will promote judicial economy and efficiency, and will,
promote the use of the United States as an international com-
mercial center. However, decisions that expand existing case law
on such amorphous bases as "public policy," rather than the lan-
guage of the Act and established precedent, have the potential
to do serious harm to the role of the United States as a center of
international finance and to United States foreign policy
interests.
The L'Europeenne decision, if it is followed in future cases,
has the potential to do exactly this kind of harm. Foreign sover-
eigns will seek to make payments in Pounds, Yen, or Deutch
Marks rather than dollars, in banks in London, Tokyo, or
conveniens dismissal in primarily foreign controversies).
161. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1874; Editorial Com-
ment, Sovereign Immunity - The case of the "Imias," 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 283
(1974) (describing Cuba's assertion to the State Department that Cuba was entitled to
immunity under international law with respect to its commercial acts, despite "unilateral
attempt of the United States to modify that doctrine").
162. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1874.
163. Note, Foreigner - Foreign State Suits, supra note 1, at 1874.
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Frankfurt rather than in New York. By temporarily intervening
in the affairs of the largest bank in Venezuela, Venezuela was
engaging in one of the most basic and traditional of sovereign
functions: regulating its domestic commerce and ensuring the
safety of its banking system. Even in the event that Venezuela's
actions were actually commercial, to hold that by denying pay-
ment to a foreign creditor with no connections to the United
States Venezuela has caused a direct effect in the United States
stretches the definition of that term well beyond the established
case law and what Congress intended.
Charles D. Day
